Protección de secretos en pipelines de CI/CD

# ❌ The "works but terrifying" approach
# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
name: Deploy
on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
 
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      # 15 secrets scattered across GitHub settings
      AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
      AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
      DATABASE_URL: ${{ secrets.DATABASE_URL }}
      REDIS_URL: ${{ secrets.REDIS_URL }}
      STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY }}
      SENDGRID_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.SENDGRID_API_KEY }}
      SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN }}
      # Nobody remembers who added these or when they were last rotated
    steps:
      - run: npm run deploy
        # All 15 secrets available to every step
        # Any compromised dependency can read them all

# ✅ Scoped secrets with minimal exposure
name: Deploy
on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
 
jobs:
  test:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    # No secrets needed for testing
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - run: npm test
 
  deploy:
    needs: test
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      id-token: write  # For OIDC — no stored credentials
      contents: read
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
      # Authenticate via OIDC — no long-lived secrets
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/deploy-role
          aws-region: us-east-1
 
      # Fetch secrets from vault, scoped to this deployment
      - name: Fetch deployment secrets
        id: secrets
        run: |
          # Secrets fetched at runtime, never stored in CI config
          vault kv get -format=json secret/prod/app | \
            jq -r '.data.data | to_entries[] | "\(.key)=\(.value)"' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
      - run: npm run deploy

// How OIDC works in CI/CD:
// 1. CI runner requests a JWT from the CI platform
// 2. Cloud provider validates the JWT against the CI platform's OIDC endpoint
// 3. Cloud provider issues short-lived credentials
// 4. Credentials expire after the job finishes
 
// ❌ Long-lived access key stored in CI secrets
// - Valid until manually rotated (often never)
// - If leaked, attacker has indefinite access
// - No way to scope to specific workflows
 
// ✅ OIDC: no secrets to leak
// - Token valid for ~1 hour
// - Scoped to specific repo/branch/workflow
// - Cloud provider validates the source

# GitHub Actions OIDC with AWS
jobs:
  deploy:
    permissions:
      id-token: write
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/github-deploy
          aws-region: us-east-1
          # No access key or secret — OIDC handles it

// AWS IAM trust policy: only trust specific repo and branch
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::123456789:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
      },
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
        },
        "StringLike": {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:myorg/myrepo:ref:refs/heads/main"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}

# ✅ Fetch from vault at runtime with short TTL
- name: Get database credentials
  id: db-creds
  run: |
    # Dynamic credentials: vault creates a temporary database user
    # that expires after 1 hour
    CREDS=$(vault read -format=json database/creds/deploy-role)
    echo "DB_USER=$(echo $CREDS | jq -r '.data.username')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
    echo "DB_PASS=$(echo $CREDS | jq -r '.data.password')" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
- name: Run migrations
  env:
    DB_USER: ${{ steps.db-creds.outputs.DB_USER }}
    DB_PASS: ${{ steps.db-creds.outputs.DB_PASS }}
  run: npm run migrate
  # After this step, credentials are no longer in environment

// Application-side: never log secrets, even accidentally
 
// ❌ Dangerous: secrets can appear in error messages
async function connectDatabase(url: string) {
  try {
    await pool.connect(url);
  } catch (error) {
    // This logs the full connection string including password
    console.error('Failed to connect:', error.message);
    throw error;
  }
}
 
// ✅ Safe: redact sensitive portions
async function connectDatabase(url: string) {
  try {
    await pool.connect(url);
  } catch (error) {
    const safeUrl = url.replace(
      /\/\/([^:]+):([^@]+)@/,
      '//$1:***@'
    );
    console.error(`Failed to connect to ${safeUrl}`);
    throw new Error('Database connection failed');
  }
}

# ✅ GitHub Actions: secrets are automatically masked in logs
# But only secrets stored in GitHub — not secrets fetched at runtime
 
- name: Mask runtime secrets
  run: |
    API_KEY=$(vault read -field=key secret/api)
    # Register with the runner's masking system
    echo "::add-mask::$API_KEY"
    echo "API_KEY=$API_KEY" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
# ✅ Prevent accidental logging in scripts
- name: Deploy with secret protection
  run: |
    set +x  # Disable command echoing
    # Use process substitution to avoid secrets in /proc
    deploy-tool --config <(echo "$DEPLOY_CONFIG")

// Build-time secret protection
class SecretGuard {
  private secrets: Set<string>;
 
  constructor(secretValues: string[]) {
    this.secrets = new Set(secretValues);
  }
 
  // Scan output before it reaches logs
  sanitize(output: string): string {
    let sanitized = output;
    for (const secret of this.secrets) {
      if (secret.length < 4) continue; // Don't mask tiny strings
      sanitized = sanitized.replaceAll(secret, '***REDACTED***');
    }
    return sanitized;
  }
 
  // Wrap console to prevent accidental logging
  wrapConsole(): void {
    const original = console.log;
    console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => {
      const sanitized = args.map((arg) =>
        typeof arg === 'string' ? this.sanitize(arg) : arg
      );
      original.apply(console, sanitized);
    };
  }
}

// Automated secret rotation workflow
interface SecretRotationConfig {
  secretPath: string;
  rotationDays: number;
  generator: () => Promise<string>;
  deployer: (newSecret: string) => Promise<void>;
  verifier: () => Promise<boolean>;
}
 
async function rotateSecret(config: SecretRotationConfig): Promise<void> {
  const newSecret = await config.generator();
 
  // Store new version (old version still active)
  await vault.write(`${config.secretPath}/pending`, {
    value: newSecret,
    created: new Date().toISOString(),
  });
 
  // Deploy new secret to consuming services
  await config.deployer(newSecret);
 
  // Verify services work with new secret
  const healthy = await config.verifier();
 
  if (healthy) {
    // Promote new secret, archive old one
    await vault.write(config.secretPath, { value: newSecret });
    await vault.delete(`${config.secretPath}/pending`);
    console.log(`Rotated ${config.secretPath} successfully`);
  } else {
    // Rollback: remove pending secret
    await vault.delete(`${config.secretPath}/pending`);
    throw new Error(
      `Rotation failed for ${config.secretPath} — rolled back`
    );
  }
}

# Vault audit log configuration
storage "raft" {
  path = "/vault/data"
}
 
listener "tcp" {
  address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
  tls_cert_file = "/vault/certs/cert.pem"
  tls_key_file = "/vault/certs/key.pem"
}
 
# Enable audit logging — every secret access is recorded
audit {
  type = "file"
  path = "/vault/logs/audit.log"
  options = {
    # HMAC secret values so they don't appear in audit logs
    hmac_accessor = true
    log_raw       = false
  }
}

// Query audit logs for security review
interface AuditQuery {
  secretPath?: string;
  actor?: string;
  operation?: 'read' | 'write' | 'delete';
  startTime: Date;
  endTime: Date;
}
 
async function querySecretAccess(query: AuditQuery) {
  // "Who accessed production database credentials this week?"
  // "Were any secrets accessed outside business hours?"
  // "Which CI jobs read the Stripe API key?"
 
  const logs = await vault.auditLog.query({
    path: query.secretPath,
    auth_entity: query.actor,
    operation: query.operation,
    start_time: query.startTime.toISOString(),
    end_time: query.endTime.toISOString(),
  });
 
  return logs.map((entry) => ({
    timestamp: entry.time,
    actor: entry.auth.display_name,
    operation: entry.request.operation,
    path: entry.request.path,
    source_ip: entry.request.remote_address,
  }));
}