Ataques de confusión de dependencias y cómo prevenirlos

// ❌ Vulnerable package.json — unscoped private package names
{
  "dependencies": {
    "auth-utils": "^1.2.0",
    "payment-service-sdk": "^3.0.0",
    "internal-logger": "^2.1.0"
  }
}
// An attacker publishes "auth-utils@99.0.0" to npm
// Package manager sees the higher version on the public registry
// Installs the attacker's malicious package instead

// ✅ Scoped packages with registry pinning
{
  "dependencies": {
    "@yourcompany/auth-utils": "^1.2.0",
    "@yourcompany/payment-service-sdk": "^3.0.0",
    "@yourcompany/internal-logger": "^2.1.0"
  }
}
// Scoped packages (@yourcompany/*) route to your private registry
// Attacker cannot claim your organization's scope on npm

# Claim your organization's scope on npm (even if you never publish there)
npm login --registry=https://registry.npmjs.org
npm org create yourcompany
# Now no attacker can publish @yourcompany/* packages publicly

// ❌ Internal package without scope
// package.json of your internal library
{
  "name": "feature-flags-sdk",
  "version": "1.3.0"
}
// Attacker can publish "feature-flags-sdk@99.0.0" on npm
 
// ✅ Internal package with scope
{
  "name": "@yourcompany/feature-flags-sdk",
  "version": "1.3.0"
}
// Only members of @yourcompany npm org can publish this

# .npmrc — explicit registry routing
# All @yourcompany packages come from your private registry
@yourcompany:registry=https://npm.yourcompany.com/
 
# Everything else comes from the public registry
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
 
# Optional: require authentication for private registry
//npm.yourcompany.com/:_authToken=${NPM_PRIVATE_TOKEN}

# .yarnrc.yml (Yarn Berry / Yarn 2+)
npmScopes:
  yourcompany:
    npmRegistryServer: "https://npm.yourcompany.com/"
    npmAuthToken: "${NPM_PRIVATE_TOKEN}"
 
npmRegistryServer: "https://registry.npmjs.org/"

// ❌ Single registry fallback — dangerous
// .npmrc with only:
// registry=https://npm.yourcompany.com/
// If private registry is down, npm falls back to public registry
// Attacker waits for an outage, or the fallback fetches malicious packages
 
// ✅ Explicit routing — no fallback ambiguity
// .npmrc with scoped registries as shown above
// @yourcompany/* → private registry (no fallback)
// everything else → public npm (no confusion)

// package-lock.json includes integrity hashes
{
  "node_modules/@yourcompany/auth-utils": {
    "version": "1.2.0",
    "resolved": "https://npm.yourcompany.com/@yourcompany/auth-utils/-/auth-utils-1.2.0.tgz",
    "integrity": "sha512-abc123def456..."
  }
}

# CI should always use frozen lockfile installation
# npm
npm ci  # Fails if lock file is out of sync with package.json
 
# yarn
yarn install --frozen-lockfile
 
# pnpm
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile

# ❌ Running 'npm install' in CI
# This can update the lock file, potentially pulling in new versions
npm install
 
# ✅ Running 'npm ci' in CI
# This installs exactly what the lock file specifies
# Fails fast if lock file and package.json disagree
npm ci

# GitHub Actions — dependency audit step
name: Security Audit
on:
  pull_request:
    paths:
      - 'package.json'
      - 'package-lock.json'
      - '.npmrc'
 
jobs:
  audit:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
      - uses: actions/setup-node@v3
        with:
          node-version: '18'
 
      - name: Install with frozen lockfile
        run: npm ci
 
      - name: Run npm audit
        run: npm audit --audit-level=high
 
      - name: Check package sources
        run: |
          # Verify all @yourcompany packages resolve to private registry
          grep -E '"resolved": "https://npm.yourcompany.com' package-lock.json \
            | wc -l
          # Verify NO @yourcompany packages resolve to public registry
          if grep -E '@yourcompany.*registry.npmjs.org' package-lock.json; then
            echo "ERROR: Internal package resolving to public registry!"
            exit 1
          fi

// Custom script to validate package sources
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
 
interface PackageLockEntry {
  version: string;
  resolved: string;
  integrity: string;
}
 
function auditPackageSources(lockfilePath: string): void {
  const lockfile = JSON.parse(readFileSync(lockfilePath, 'utf-8'));
  const packages = lockfile.packages || {};
 
  for (const [name, meta] of Object.entries<PackageLockEntry>(packages)) {
    if (name.includes('@yourcompany/')) {
      const isPrivateRegistry = meta.resolved?.startsWith(
        'https://npm.yourcompany.com'
      );
      if (!isPrivateRegistry) {
        console.error(
          `SECURITY: ${name} resolves to unexpected registry: ${meta.resolved}`
        );
        process.exit(1);
      }
    }
  }
 
  console.log('All internal packages resolve to private registry.');
}
 
auditPackageSources('package-lock.json');

defense_layers:
  1_scoping:
    action: "Scope all internal packages under @yourcompany"
    blocks: "Attacker cannot claim your scope on public registry"
 
  2_registry_routing:
    action: "Pin scopes to specific registries in .npmrc"
    blocks: "Package manager never queries wrong registry"
 
  3_lock_files:
    action: "Use npm ci with integrity hashes in CI"
    blocks: "Even if resolution is wrong, hash mismatch stops install"
 
  4_auditing:
    action: "Automated CI checks for package source URLs"
    blocks: "Catches misconfigurations before they reach production"
 
  5_monitoring:
    action: "Alert on new packages appearing in lock file diffs"
    blocks: "Human review of unexpected dependency changes"