Docker-Container in Produktion absichern

# ❌ Bloated image with unnecessary attack surface
FROM ubuntu:22.04
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
    python3 python3-pip curl wget vim git openssh-client
COPY . /app
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install -r requirements.txt
CMD ["python3", "app.py"]
# Result: 850MB image with SSH client, git, vim, wget
# Every extra binary is a potential exploit vector
 
# ✅ Multi-stage build with minimal runtime image
FROM python:3.11-slim AS builder
WORKDIR /build
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --target=/deps -r requirements.txt
 
FROM python:3.11-slim
RUN groupadd -r appuser && useradd -r -g appuser appuser
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /deps /usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/
COPY --chown=appuser:appuser . .
USER appuser
EXPOSE 8000
CMD ["python3", "app.py"]
# Result: 180MB image, no extra tools, non-root user

# Even better: distroless images (no shell, no package manager)
FROM python:3.11-slim AS builder
WORKDIR /build
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --target=/deps -r requirements.txt
 
FROM gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /deps /usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/
COPY . .
USER nonroot
CMD ["app.py"]
# No shell means an attacker who gets code execution
# cannot spawn a reverse shell or run arbitrary commands

# GitHub Actions: scan images on every push
name: Container Security Scan
on: [push]
 
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
 
      - name: Build image
        run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .
 
      - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
        with:
          image-ref: myapp:${{ github.sha }}
          format: table
          exit-code: 1
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
          # Fail the build if CRITICAL or HIGH vulnerabilities found

# Local scanning with Trivy
trivy image myapp:latest
 
# Scan for misconfigurations in Dockerfile
trivy config --severity HIGH,CRITICAL .
 
# Pin base image digests to prevent supply chain attacks
# Instead of:  FROM python:3.11-slim
# Use:         FROM python:3.11-slim@sha256:abc123...
# This ensures the exact same base image every build
docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' python:3.11-slim

# docker-compose.yml with security hardening
version: "3.8"
 
services:
  api:
    image: myapp:latest
    user: "1000:1000"  # Run as non-root
    read_only: true     # Read-only filesystem
    tmpfs:
      - /tmp:noexec,nosuid,size=100m  # Writable tmp with limits
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true  # Prevent privilege escalation
    cap_drop:
      - ALL                     # Drop all Linux capabilities
    cap_add:
      - NET_BIND_SERVICE        # Only add what's needed
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          cpus: "1.0"
          memory: 512M
        reservations:
          cpus: "0.25"
          memory: 128M
    networks:
      - frontend
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "wget", "--spider", "-q", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 3
 
  database:
    image: postgres:15-alpine
    user: "999:999"
    read_only: true
    tmpfs:
      - /tmp:noexec,nosuid
      - /var/run/postgresql:noexec,nosuid
    volumes:
      - db-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true
    cap_drop:
      - ALL
    networks:
      - backend  # Database only accessible from backend network
 
networks:
  frontend:
  backend:
    internal: true  # No external access
 
volumes:
  db-data:

// ❌ Common Docker security mistakes
 
// Mounting the Docker socket — gives container full host control
// -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
// An attacker can create privileged containers, access host filesystem
 
// Running as root (the default)
// Any container escape gives root on the host
 
// Using --privileged flag
// Disables all security features: capabilities, seccomp, AppArmor
 
// Hardcoded secrets in environment variables
// docker run -e DATABASE_PASSWORD=hunter2 myapp
 
// ✅ Secure alternatives
const securityChecklist = {
  noDockerSocket: "Never mount Docker socket into application containers",
  nonRootUser: "Always specify USER in Dockerfile",
  noPrivileged: "Never use --privileged; add specific capabilities instead",
  secretsManagement: "Use Docker secrets or external vault for credentials",
  readOnlyFs: "Use read_only: true with explicit tmpfs for writable paths",
  resourceLimits: "Always set CPU and memory limits",
  networkSegmentation: "Use separate networks; mark internal where possible",
};

# Docker Swarm secrets (encrypted at rest and in transit)
version: "3.8"
 
services:
  api:
    image: myapp:latest
    secrets:
      - db_password
      - api_key
    environment:
      DB_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/db_password
      API_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/api_key
 
secrets:
  db_password:
    external: true
  api_key:
    external: true

import { readFileSync } from "fs";
 
// Read secrets from mounted files (works with Docker secrets,
// Kubernetes secrets, and Vault agent injector)
function getSecret(name: string): string {
  const filePath = process.env[`${name}_FILE`];
  if (filePath) {
    return readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8").trim();
  }
 
  // Fallback to environment variable for local development
  const envValue = process.env[name];
  if (envValue) {
    return envValue;
  }
 
  throw new Error(`Secret ${name} not configured`);
}
 
const dbPassword = getSecret("DB_PASSWORD");
const apiKey = getSecret("API_KEY");

# Falco rules for runtime container monitoring
# Falco watches syscalls and alerts on suspicious activity
 
- rule: Unexpected outbound connection
  desc: Detect container connecting to IP not in allowlist
  condition: >
    evt.type=connect and fd.typechar=4
    and container.id != host
    and not fd.sip in (allowed_outbound_ips)
  output: >
    Unexpected outbound connection
    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     connection=%fd.name user=%user.name)
  priority: WARNING
 
- rule: Shell spawned in container
  desc: Detect shell execution inside a container
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container
    and proc.name in (bash, sh, zsh, dash, csh)
  output: >
    Shell spawned in container
    (container=%container.name shell=%proc.name
     parent=%proc.pname user=%user.name)
  priority: WARNING

# Health check script that verifies container security posture
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
 
echo "=== Container Security Audit ==="
 
# Check if running as root
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
  echo "FAIL: Running as root"
else
  echo "PASS: Running as non-root (uid=$(id -u))"
fi
 
# Check if filesystem is read-only
if touch /test-write 2>/dev/null; then
  rm /test-write
  echo "FAIL: Root filesystem is writable"
else
  echo "PASS: Root filesystem is read-only"
fi
 
# Check for unnecessary capabilities
if capsh --print 2>/dev/null | grep -q "cap_sys_admin"; then
  echo "FAIL: Container has CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
else
  echo "PASS: No dangerous capabilities"
fi
 
# Check for mounted Docker socket
if [ -e /var/run/docker.sock ]; then
  echo "FAIL: Docker socket is mounted"
else
  echo "PASS: No Docker socket"
fi